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THE LIMITS OF LITIGATION: PUTTING THE 
EDUCATION BACK INTO BROWN f/. 
BOARD OF EDUCATION 
T. Alexander Aleinikojj1' 
SHADES OF BROWN: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON SCHOOL DESEG-
REGATION. Edited by Derrick Bell. New York: Teachers College 
Press. 1980. Pp. x, 150. $11.95. 
Brown v. Board of Education 1 has been a conundrum from the 
start. Perhaps no Supreme Court decision reaches a more unassail-
ably just holding with less scholarly support for its reasoning.2 De-
pending on one's view of what it promised, Brown is either a 
monument to the law's power to change social conditions or a bea-
con on a distant ridge of unfulfilled hopes.3 The desegregation of 
public schools has required massive judicial involvement in the re-
structuring of social institutions. Yet, nearly three decades after 
Brown, racially segregated schools remain the norm in many Ameri-
can cities.4 
In Shades of Brown, Derrick Bell has collected eight essays that 
• Assistant Professor of Law, University of Michigan. B.A. 1974, Swarthmore College; 
J.D. 1977, Yale University. - Ed. 
I would like to thank Vincent Blasi, Christina Whitman, and Michael Rosenzweig for their 
thoughtful co=ents on an earlier draft. 
l. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
2. See, e.g., Cahn, Jurisprudence, 30 N.Y.U. L. REV. 150 (1955); Kurland, "Brown v. 
Board of Education Was the Beginning:" The School Desegregation Cases in the United Stales 
Supreme Court: 1954-1979, 1979 WASH. U. L.Q. 309, 316-20; Pollak, Racial Discrimination and 
Judicial Integrity: A Reply to Professor Wechsler, 108 U. PA. L. REV. l (1959); Wechsler, To-
ward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. l (1959). 
3. Compare Bell, p. viii ("The Brown decision has accomplished much that is worthwhile, 
but the twenty-fifth anniversary of that decision has come and gone, leaving in its wake more 
basis for commiseration than celebration."), with N. GLAZER, AFFIRMATIVE DISCRIMINATION: 
ETHNIC INEQUALITY AND PUBLIC POLICY 127 (1978) (''The promise of Brown was realized. 
Black children may not be denied admittance to any school on account of their race • • • ."). 
4. See Bell, p. viii: 
More than half of the nation's seven million black students reside in the 100 largest 
school districts. Over two million of these black children attend schools in the nation's 
twenty largest urban districts. Nine out often of them are attending predominantly black 
schools. The twenty largest districts average about 60 percent nonwhite, and many major 
districts, like Atlanta, Detroit, and Chicago, are more than 80 percent nonwhite. 
See also U.S. COMMN. ON CIVIL RIGHTS, WITH ALL DELIBERATE SPEED: 1954-19?? 31 (1981) 
(while percentage of black students attending majority-white schools has increased from 23% 
in 1968 to 38% in 1978, in the 1978-1979 school year 60.2% of all minority students attended 
schools that were at least 50% minority and 37% attended schools that were at least 80% 
minority). 
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argue it is time to reassess the promise and progress of Brown. That 
promise, the authors assert, was primarily one of a better education 
for black children. Yet Brown has come to stand more· for racial 
balance and busing than for a quality education. Shades oJ Brown is 
an attempt to set a new course - "to uncover remedies supported by 
Brown along heretofore uncharted routes" (p. ix). 
Bell recognizes that the view that Brown mandates books, not 
buses, is likely to draw fire from the civil rights community, which 
has souglit strenuously to maintain a united front.5 But Bell and his 
coauthors believe that black parents are increasingly disenchanted 
with busing and that no solid empirical evidence establishes that 
busing substantially improves the quality of education. These con-
cerns, together with strong white opposition to busing, suggest the 
need to consider alternative remedial strategies. Thus the essayists 
are willing to "depart from the unwritten civil rights Commandment: 
Thou shalt not publicly criticize" (p. ix). An evaluation of their pro-
posals requires first a revisit with the history of Brown and its 
aftermath. 
I. FROM EQUALIZATION TO INTEGRATION 
The road to Brown was carefully planned, brilliantly executed, 
and appropriately conservative. The litigation strategy adopted by 
the NAACP attorneys in the early part of this century has had a 
significant, if not a determinative, impact on the development of 
post-Brown remedies. From the start the school litigation had two 
intertwined goals: better schools for black children and integration. 
Brown, when it arrived, was not just a school case; it was the 
NAACP's flagship in its attack on Jim Crow in all its social 
manifestations. 
The chief obstacle to ending segregation was the Supreme 
Court's 1896 decision in Plessy v. Ferguson,6 which held that sepa-
rate-but-equal facilities for blacks and whites did not offend the 
fourteenth amendment. Plessy spawned scores of suits demonstrat-
ing the inequality of facilities provided to blacks.7 These cases, how-
5. See, e.g., Jones,School Desegregation, 86 YALE L.J. 378 (1976) (letter to the editor). The 
most celebrated case in which anti-busing heathens were thrown out of the civil rights temple 
occurred in 1973 in Atlanta. When the local NAACP chapter approved a plan calling for a 
drastic reduction in busing in exchange for more black school administrators, the national 
NAACP office suspended the Atlanta office. See J. WILKINSON, FROM BROWN TO BAKKE 233 
(1979). 
6. 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
7. These cases are collected in Larson, The New Law ef Race Relations, 1969 WIS. L. REv. 
470, 482-83 n.27; Leflar & Davis, Segregation in the Public Schoo/s-1953, 67 HARV. L. REv. 
377, 430-35 (1954). 
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ever, tended to produce court orders requiring equalization, rather 
than integration. P!essy demanded no more. 
In the second quarter of this century, the NAACP began to craft 
a litigation strategy that sought integration, not simply equalization 
of separate facilities. 8 The litigators decided to launch their attack 
on the graduate and professional school level. There, the general 
lack of any facilities for black students would give the courts nothing 
to "equalize." Since states were unlikely to "build a cyclotron for 
one student,"9 victory at the graduate level seemed to assure a court 
order requiring the segregated institution to admit the black plaintiff. 
The graduate strategy had the additional benefit of demanding inte-
gration in its most modest form: the entry of a single black student 
into an all-white program - a far less threatening prospect than the 
mixing of separate black and white school systems. In cases where 
states had provided separate, but vastly inferior, graduate programs 
for blacks, the NAACP began to argue that the educational opportu-
nity provided in the black institution was necessarily inferior to what 
would be offered in an integrated program. The plan produced im-
portant victories in United States ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 10 Sweatt v. 
Painter,1 1 and McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents. 12 
In 1950, the NAACP attorneys turned their attention to their pri-
mary goal: desegregation of elementary and secondary schools. The 
existence of separate black school systems made the achievement of 
integration far less certain, since courts were likely to hold that 
Plessy demanded only equalization. In Sweatt the NAACP had ar-
gued that Plessy was no longer controlling, but the Supreme Court 
had ruled for the plaintiffs without reconsidering the earlier deci-
sion.13 In order to bring down Jim Crow schools with one bold 
stroke, the NAACP lawyers had to persuade the Court thatP!essy-
at least in the field of education - was no longer good law. 
The civil rights litigators gave the Court two choices. They made 
a direct assault on Plessy, arguing that segregation constituted an 
arbitrary classification based on race and was thus per se unconstitu-
8. See generally J. GREENBERG, CASES AND MATERIALS ON JUDICIAL PROCESS AND So-
CIAL CHANGE 49-89 (1977). 
9. Kelly, The School .Desegregation Case, in QUARRELS THAT HAVE SHAPED THE CoNSTl· 
TUTION 243, 254-55 (J. Garranty ed. 1964) (quoting Oklahoma University President George L. 
Cross). 
10. 305 U.S. 337 (1938). 
11. 339 U.S. 629 (1950). 
12. 339 U.S. 637 (1950). 
13. 339 U.S. at 636. 
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tional. 14 But they also provided the Court with an argument that did 
not call for the express overruling of Plessy. Relying upon findings 
and testimony in the district courts, 15 the NAACP asserted that seg-
regation inflicted psychological harm on black schoolchildren 
whether or not the physical school facilities provided to blacks and 
whites were equal.16 As Robert Carter told the Supreme Court at 
oral argument: "Here we abandon any claim . . . of any constitu-
tional inequality which comes from anything other than the act of 
segregation itself."17 If segregation, ipso facto, created inequality, 
thenP!essy did not apply. Furthermore, equalization of the separate 
school systems could not be an effective remedy. 18 The Constitution 
demanded one school system - i e. , integration. 
The Court, as all know, held that separate schools for blacks and 
whites are inherently unequal. Its approach was no doubt counseled 
by caution. It did not expressly abandon Plessy, and held only that 
"in the field of public education the doctrine of 'separate but equal' 
has no place." 19 An alternative holding that state-enforced separa-
tion of the races was a per se constitutional violation would have 
proscribed segregation everywhere.20 Because it focused on the edu-
cational harm caused.by segregation, the Court could be seen as tak-
ing the limited step of condemning only segregated schools. 
The determination that separate schools were inherently unequal 
naturally suggested an integration remedy. Had the Court found 
that the constitutional harm had arisen solely from the insult of as-
signment by race, any neutral school assignment plan would have 
satisfied the fourteenth amendment. But if segregated schools were 
by definition inferior schools, ending assignment by race would not 
be sufficient where it did not yield integrated schools. Pragmatic and 
14. Brief for Appellant at 6-8, Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), reprinted in 
49 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES (P. 
Kurland & G. Casper eds. 1975). 
15. See 347 U.S. at 494 & n.10. 
16. The district court in Brown found that the black and white schools in Topeka were 
effectively equal in terms of physical plant, educational programs, and quality of teachers. 
Brown v. Board of Educ., 98 F. Supp. 797, 798 (D. Kan. 1951) (three-judge court). 
17. Quoted in ARGUMENT: THE ORAL ARGUMENT BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT IN 
BROWN v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF TOPEKA, 1952-55 at 13 (L. Friedman ed. 1969). 
18. Brief for Appellant (Brown v. Board of Educ.), supra_ note 14, at 8-13. See Brief for 
Appellant, Briggs v. Elliott (companion case ofBrown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954)), 
reprinted in 49 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
UNITED STATES 12-16 (P. Kurland & G. Casper eds. 1975). 
19. 347 U.S. at 495. 
20. Of course, the subsequent per curiam opinions desegregating public parks, beaches and 
buses made clear that Brown was not limited to schools. See New Orleans City Park Improve-
ment Assn. v. Detiege, 358 U.S. 54 (1958); Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (1956); Mayor & 
City Council of Baltimore v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 877 (1955). 
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paternalistic considerations also supported an integrationist remedial 
strategy. One could assume that white-dominated school districts 
would look after schools attended by white children. Ensuring that 
black children attended the same schools as white children thus 
made it more likely that black children would receive an adequate 
education. As Bell has noted elsewhere, "to get what the white kids 
have, you must go where the white kids are."21 Integrating the 
schools also lessened the courts' remedial duties. Rather than evalu-
ating whether white and black schools were in fact providing equal 
resources and programs, courts could guarantee equality by placing 
blacks and whites in the same schools, where every child would re-
ceive the same educational package. The choice for integration was 
further supported by the prevailing belief that black children would 
learn better if they were exposed to white children.22 The ideal 
America, in short, was one in which diverse groups lived as neigh-
bors - sharing schools, friends, and an ideology of equality.23 
Whether these considerations alone would have produced a vir-
tual requirement of integrated public schools, massive Southern 
resistance to Brown (or token compliance with it) ensured the result. 
Thus, while an early interpretation of Brown held that it required 
only an end to racial assignment, not integration,24 the Fifth Circuit 
21. Bell, School Litigation Strategies far the 1970's: New Phases in the Continuing Quest for 
Quality Schools, 1970 WIS. L. REV. 257, 275. 
22. See J. WILKINSON, supra note 5, at 46. One court has termed this notion the "osmosis 
effect." Kelley v. Metropolitan County Bd. of Educ., 492 F. Supp. 167, 191 (M.D. Tenn. 1980). 
23. The integration remedy may also be viewed as a reaction to radical black groups who 
argued in the 1960s and 1970s that separate schools run by and for blacks would be a more 
effective remedy for past discrimination in education than integration in a white-dominated 
school system. The Congress on Racial Equality (CORE) filed an amicus brief in Swann v. 
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. I (1971), which argued: 
Integration, as it is designed, places the Black child in the position of implied inferi-
ority. Not only is he asked to give up much of his culture and identity, but with the 
dispersal of Blacks he loses many of the communal ties which have traditionally been the 
cornerstone of the Black community. Moreover, there can never be true integration be-
tween groups until there is a real parity relationship existing between them. 
White schools at this time do not constitute the kind of environment which can foster 
the healthy development of Black children. White school boards make it difficult for even 
Black schools to respond to the special needs of Black children. In this respect, however, 
many Black teachers and administrators have tried, within the narrow limits allowed 
them, to satisfy these needs. 
With the guarantee of equal resources and with the freedom to proceed as is expedi-
ent, Black schools would be a superior learning environment and could graduate students 
who can succeed in an interracial world. 
Brief for CORE as Amicus Curiae, Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. I 
(1971), reprinted in EDUCATION FOR WHOM? 205 (C. Tesconi & E. Hurwitz eds. 1974), See 
generally C. WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW 195-208 (3d ed. 1974). 
24. Briggs v. Elliott, 132 F. Supp. 776, 777 (E.D.S.C. 1955) (three-judge court). 
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resoundingly rejected this view.25 Soon thereafter, the Supreme 
Court required integration in everything but name in Green v.. County 
School Board.26 In Green, the Court held that a freedom-of-choice 
assignment plan that maintained the pre-existing pattern of segre-
gated schools did not satisfy Brown. School systems that were segre-
gated by law in 1954 would have to be dismantled "root and 
branch."27 Although subsequent cases continued to speak the lan-
guage of desegregation, they made clear that the only acceptable 
remedy for unlawful dual school systems was, in fact, integration.28 
Thus remedial, pragmatic, and moral considerations all helped to 
transform Brown into a case that effectively mandated integration. 
This is not to say that a choice was being made between education 
and integration. Consistent with the language of Brown, the strategy 
of the NAACP, and the prevailing liberal ideology, integration was 
viewed as guaranteeing equality of educational opportunity.29 A 
quarter century of experience, however, has produced revisionism in 
the civil rights ranks. White opposition to busing plans, the frustra-
tion experienced by courts in supervising decrees in the face of shift-
ing demographic data, and doubts about whether integration 
demonstrably improves educational performance have led some to 
reassess the progress of Brown. 
Shades of Brown is a dramatic example of that reassessment. The 
essays, presented in earlier versions at a 1978 Harvard Law School 
symposium, tell different-parts of the story. Several note the trans-
formation of Brown from an education to a busing case. 30 Others 
assert that a proper appreciation of the nature of racial discrimina-
tion would produce remedies that demand equality of results, not 
merely integration.31 Two educators argue that black children need 
25. United States v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 372 F.2d 836, 846 n.5, 861-78 (1966); 
q/fd en bane, 380 F.2d 385 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 840 (1967). 
26. 391 U.S. 430 (1968). 
27. 391 U.S. at 438. 
28. E.g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971). See Keyes v. 
School District No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 219-23 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting 
in part). See generally L. GRAOLIA, DISASTER BY DECREE (1976); Fiss, School Desegregation: 
The Uncertain Path of the Law, 4 PHIL. & Pull. AFF. 3 (1974). 
29. Derrick Bell has described this development in an earlier piece: 
Somewhere in the struggle to overcome the fierce resistance to desegregation, civil 
rights lawyers and others, and particularly the courts, began to equate the elimination of 
the dual school system with the attainment of equal educational opportunity. 
Bell, Waiting on the Promise of Brown, 39 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 341, 344 (1975). 
30. E.g., Bell, Brown and the Interest-Convergence Dilemma, p. 90; Freeman, School Deseg-
regation Law: Promise, Contradiction, Rationalization, p. 70; Ravitch, Desegregation: Varieties 
of Meaning, p. 30. 
31. E.g., Freeman, supra note 30; Lawrence, "One More River to Cross" - Recognizing the 
Real Injury in Brown: A Prerefjllisite to Shaping New Remedies, p. 48. 
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not .attend an integrated school to receive an effective education.32 
Finally, Bell offers a model alternative desegregation plan that con-
centrates on education instead of on racial balance. 33 This Review 
will evaluate several of the essays before confronting the book's cen-
tral thesis. 34 
II. A SAMPLING OF THE NEW PERSPECTIVES 
A. ''A Lawyer in the Case"35 
Robert Carter, presently a federal district judge and one of the 
lawyers who argued Brown, states that the "basic postulate" of the 
litigative strategy in 1954 was that "the elimination of enforced seg-
regated education would necessarily result in equal education" (p. 
23). To the NAACP, "[i]ntegrated education appeared to be an in-
dispensable means to equal education. Indeed, to us equal educa-
tion meant integrated education" (p. 22). 
Carter believes that the NAACP's thesis "never had a fair test" 
(p. 25) because of residential segregation in the North and resistance 
to busing. While Carter believes that "integration must remain the 
long-range goal," he recognizes that "the reality is that hundreds of 
thousands of black children are attending all black or predominantly 
black schools" (p. 26). He thus asserts that in the short-run "we have 
to concentrate on finding ways of improving the quality of education 
in [racially imbalanced urban] schools, even if it means or results in 
less effort being expended on school integration" (p. 26). 
An approach that strives to improve educational opportunities in 
predominantly black schools is arguably at odds with the "separate 
is inherently unequal" language of Brown. But Carter believes that 
his new approach is attainable under Brown: 
While we fashioned Brown on the theory that equal education and 
integrated education were one and the same, the goal was not integra-
tion but equal educational opportunity. Similarly, although the 
Supreme Court in 1954 believed that educational equality mandated 
integration, Brown requires equal educational opportunity. If that can 
be achieved without integration, Brown has been satisfied. [P. 27.] 
To realize this new interpretation of Brown, Carter calls on "edu-
cators [to] articulate the indispensable ingredients of educational 
32. Edmonds, Effective Education far Minority Pupils: Brown Confounded or Co'!firmed, p. 
108; Lightfoot, Families as Educators: The Forgotten People ef Brown, p. 20. 
33. Bell, A Model Alternative Desegregation Plan, p. 124. 
34. The two essays that argue that integrated schools are not a prerequisite for effective 
educations for black school children, see note 32 supra, will not be reviewed. 
35. This Section reviews Carter, A Reassessment ef Brown v. Board, p. 21. 
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equality to enable judges and lawyers to develop an accommodating 
constitutional doctrine" (p. 26). That doctrine, according to Carter, 
should go beyond simply guaranteeing equality of inputs (such as 
per capita expenditures, curriculum, and quality of instruction); it 
should focus as well on educational output. 
The problems with Carter's approach, however, seem intractable. 
While it is likely that educators could produce the desired definition 
of equal educational opportunity, it is unlikely that judges will fash-
ion a constitutional doctrine to accommodate it. To reinterpret 
Brown as mandating equal educational opportunity irrespective of 
the racial composition of the schools will present severe difficulties 
for the courts. Under the separate-is-inherently-unequal doctrine, 
equality of educational opportunity can be achieved by placing 
black and white students in the same schools. Courts are not re-
quired to weigh the benefits of particular educational programs; they 
must simply ensure that students of both races receive the same edu-
cation, whatever the content of that education. Under Carter's strat-
egy, courts would be thrust into the role of evaluating the merits of 
educational programs provided to black and white children in sepa-
rate schools. 
Courts have been unwilling to embrace a constitutional theory 
based upon judicial evaluation of the educational process.36 Inter-
estingly, the NAACP brief in Briggs v. Elliott (a case argued with 
Brown), specifically noted the unworkability of a remedy aimed at 
equalizing educational opportunity: 
Education is not an inert subject. Teachers differ in ability, person-
ality and effectiveness, and their teachings correspondingly vary in 
value. Schools differ in size, location and environment . . . . Public 
education ... is an ever-growing and progressing field. Facilities and 
methods improve as experience demonstrates the need and the way. 
Buildings and facilities are constantly increased to accommodate the 
expanding school population. It seems clear that no two schools can 
retain a constant and fixed relationship on the flux of educational pro-
gress. Certainly this relationship cannot be fixed or maintained by ju-
dicial decree. Resolution of the basic issue in this case - the right to 
equal educational benefits - by an equalization decree will engage the 
parties and the court interminably.37 
Furthermore, many independent variables, such as family involve-
36. See, e.g., San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973); Bur-
russ v. Wilkerson, 310 F. Supp. 572 (W.D. Va. 1969), a.ffd per curiam, 397 U.S. 44 (1970); 
Mcinnis v. Shapiro, 293 F. Supp. 327 (N.D. Ill. 1968), a.ffd per curiam sub nom. Mcinnis v. 
Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 322 (1969). But see Robinson v. Cahill, 62 N.J. 473, 303 A.2d 273, cert. 
denied, 414 U.S. 976 (1973). The argument that the fourteenth amendment guarantees a right 
to an effective education is discussed in text preceding note 87 i,ifra. 
37. Brief for Appellant (Briggs v. El/ioll), supra note 18, at 30. 
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ment, neighborhood conditions, and teacher expectations, are likely 
to affect individual academic achievement.38 Any resulting disparity 
between the value of the education received in racially identifiable 
schools may be difficult to attribute directly to the school authorities 
and the educational program. Carter's reinterpretation of Brown 
thus raises serious problems of measurement and causation -
problems that courts are likely to avoid by maintaining the current 
view that Brown requires dismantlement of dual school systems, not 
effective education. 
Just as the Court in Brown could not "tum the clock back to 1868 
when the Amendment was adopted, or even to 1896 when Plessy v. 
Ferguson was written,"39 neither can Carter tum the clock back to 
1954 and rewrite his brief. Integration - in schools, public build-
ings, public parks - was the goal of the litigation strategy that 
produced Brown. That is the ·way Carter argued it and the way the 
Court wrote it. It is doubtful that we can get beyond Brown by 
"rediscovering" it. 
B. "The Viewpoint of Histo,y"40 
Diane Ravitch, a professor at Columbia University's Teachers 
College, ably reviews the NAACP's arguments in Brown. She as-
serts that the plaintiffs' primary argument was that state-imposed 
segregation is per se unconstitutional - a position not directly an-
swered by the Court. She labels as "secondary" the claim accepted 
by the Court, that minority children are psychologically harmed by 
state-imposed segregation. Ravitch states that the psychological 
harm claim ran in two directions, each with different remedial impli-
cations: (1) Segregation caused harm by officially sanctioning the 
doctrine of black inferiority (suggesting a remedy of color-blind poli-
cies); and (2) black school children were harmed by a lack of inter-
action with white children (suggesting an integration remedy) (p. 
37). 
Ravitch notes that this remedial ambiguity can be traced 
throughout the entire record of Brown; "[i]n essence, the civil rights 
lawyers were simultaneously advocating both color-blind legal 
equality and color-conscious school integration" (p. 37). The ambi-
guity evolved into "an outright contradiction" in the quarter-century 
38. See Goodman, De Facio School Segregation: A Constitutional and Empirical Analysis, 
60 CALIF. L. REv. 275, 400-35 (1972); Lightfoot, supra note 32, at pp. 11-17. See generally ON 
EQUALITY OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY (F. Mosteller & D. Moynihan eds. 1972), 
39. 347 U.S. at 492. 
40. This Section reviews Ravitch, supra note 30. 
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following Brown, "since color-blind policies became, in many places, 
an obstacle to school integration" (p. 37). Ravitch maintains that the 
shift in the meaning of desegregation from color-blindness to color-
conscious integration was due to massive resistance in the South, lib-
eral support for an integrated society, and the notion of a "common 
school ideal" that could "hasten the assimilation of minorities to 
American culture" and serve as a "pillar of democracy'' by equaliz-
ing cultural and class differences (pp. 39-40). These considerations, 
coupled with prevailing sociological and historical notions of the 
1960s that blacks "had been culturally and psychologically damaged 
by historical discrimination," lent intellectual support to the view 
that a black school could not be a good school (p. 42). 
In assessing the meaning of Brown today, Ravitch argues that 
"we must recognize that it deals not just with the question of access 
to schools, but with the question of how to define Black people and 
what part Blacks should play in defining their own purposes" (p. 44). 
She thus argues that "the role of government must be to provide 
Blacks with the opportunity and the means to make choices for 
themselves" (p. 44). Desegregation 
should mean the removal of all barriers based on race, but it should 
not mean the dismantling of autonomous Black institutions . . . . It 
should mean a heightened consciousness of the value of interracial 
contact in every sphere of activity, but it should not mean that a stigma 
must be attached to any activities pursued by Blacks without the par-
ticipation of non-Blacks. [P. 45] 
Ravitch's essay persuasively suggests that the integrationist 
model may disserve minority interests to the extent that it hampers 
opportunities for the development of autonomous black institutions. 
Moreover, as she notes, the intellectual underpinnings of the model 
- that, as Bell states, black culture is seen "as a stigma by whites 
and a handicap to blacks" (p. 30) - are open to serious challenge. 
The legal implications of her approach, however, are not spelled out. 
Ravitch concedes that the essay is an attempt to reexamine "the in-
tellectual bases of social policy'' and that it "raises questions instead 
of providing answers" (pp. 45-46). · · 
The major question that it raises is: How can Ravitch's preferred 
definition of "desegregation" be implemented in the context of a 
school case? Her reinterpretation would appear to authorize - if 
not favor - "freedom of choice" plans that eliminate school assign-
ment based on race and permit students to attend any school within 
a district. These plans, developed early on by school officials in re-
sponse to post-Brown desegregation orders, were ultimately rejected 
by the courts because they resulted in the maintenance of separate 
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and unequal schools.41 Although Ravitch would probably not read 
Brown to permit the use of freedom-of-choice plans that intention-
ally result in the retention of dual school systems, it is not clear how 
she would distinguish benign from stigmatizing plans. One answer 
may be to permit adoption of freedom-of-choice plans where minor-
ity plaintiffs request them: Blacks are not likely to feel stigmatized 
by racially identifiable schools where they have chosen them as a 
route to self-realization. Ravitch's reinterpretation of Brown, there-
fore, could form the basis for a remedial strategy that eradicates bar-
riers based on race without mandating integration.42 
But two problems remain. First, no matter how blacks view sep-
arate schools, whites may continue to view black schools as bad 
schools. Thus Ravitch's solution could reinforce white perceptions 
that hinder the attainment of full citizenship and equal opportunities 
for blacks. More important, Ravitch's essay offers little to predomi-
nantly black inner-city school districts. Schools in such districts may 
come close to Ravitch's goal of "autonomous" black institutions, but 
many of them remain, in Judge Carter's words, ''woefully inade-
quate [in providing] tools that will enable poor blacks to become a 
part of the mainstream of the social, economic, and political life of 
the country" (p. 26). Ravitch's interpretation of Brown appears to do 
no more for these schools than does the integrationist interpretation 
that she rejects. 
C. "The True Nature of Segregation"43 
The thesis of Charles Lawrence's essay is that the Supreme 
Court's fundamental misunderstanding of the nature of segregation 
produced an incorrectly reasoned opinion in Brown and fostered an 
inappropriate remedial scheme. Lawrence asserts that segregation 
constitutes a per se violation of the fourteenth amendment because 
its sole purpose is to label blacks as inferior. Had the Court so rea-
soned in Brown, it would have demanded remedies that destroyed 
the system of segregation and removed the badge of inferiority. In-
stead, by focusing on the psychological harm caused by separation, 
41. See Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968); United States v. Jefferson 
County Bd. of Educ., 372 F.2d 836 (1966), qffd en bane, 380 F.2d 385 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 
389 U.S. 840 (1967). 
42. Goodman, The .Desegregation .Dilemma: A Vote far Voluntarism, 1979 WASH. U. L.Q. 
407. 
43. This Section reviews Lawrence, supra note 31. Charles Lawrence is a professor at the 
San Francisco School of Law. Portions of this essay appeared in Lawrence's article, 
Segregation "Misunderstood'~· The Milliken .Decision Revisited, 12 U.S.F. L. Rev. 15 (1977). 
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Lawrence argues, the court necessarily adopted a more limited reme-
dial strategy of integration (p. 52). 
Lawrence's broad view of segregation as a system leads him to 
criticize the Court's requirement that unlawful segregation be 
demonstrated by particular segregative acts of school authorities. 
For Lawrence, the insult of segregation is communicated by the en-
tire social system that labels black schools as bad schools solely be-
cause they are attended by black children. Any state action that 
reinforces a segregated society becomes relevant to determination of 
the constitutional issue, including segregated housing and zoning 
practices and discriminatory acts (even those outside of the particu-
lar school district) that tend to label blacks as inferior (p. 53). 
Lawrence also takes issue with the Court's unwillingness to ex-
tend liability to school districts that ceased practicing segregation 
before 1954. He argues that the label of inferiority remains even 
after the name-calling stops. "Once the system is established," Law-
rence states, "any attempt to distinguish 'active' governmental in-
volvement in racial segregation from 'passive' or 'neutral' tolerance 
of private segregation is illusory. Present passivity is merely a con-
tinuation of past actions" (p. 56).44 
Lawrence's definition of the constitutional violation has obvious 
implications for his views on appropriate remedies. If any state ac-
tion that labels blacks as inferior contributes to a denial of equal 
opportunity, all such sources of injury should be removed: 
The injury inflicted by a segregated school system is inseparable 
from the injury inflicted by segregated housing or public accommoda-
tions because each reinforces the other and because removal of one 
will not heal the injury without the removal of the other. [P. 59.] 
Lawrence's analysis is carried furthest in his discussion of the 
Court's decision in Washington v. IJavis,45 which held that the plain-
tiffs must prove the defendant's intent to discriminate in order to 
establish that a police hiring examination violated the fourteenth 
amendment. Relying upon the Supreme Court's decision in Green,46 
Lawrence argues that it should be enough to prove that a segregated 
police department had once operated as part of a state-sanctioned 
system of segregation and that present underrepresentation of blacks 
is a remnant of that system. "The burden would rest on the state to 
44. Other scholars have argued that government bears a moral responsibility for present 
inequalities due to its failure to outlaw private discrimination. See, e.g., Perry, The JJispropor-
tionate Impact Tlzeo,y of Racial JJiscrimination, 125 U. PA. L. RE.v. 540, 558 (1977). 
45. 426 U.S. 229 (1976). . 
46. 391 U.S. 430 (1968). 
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prove that they had effectively destroyed the Institution of Segrega-
tion . . ." (p. 63).47 This approach, urges Lawrence, would mean 
that individuals who benefit from past acts of segregation would take 
some responsibility for the system's continuing effects (p. 64). 
Lawrence's thesis may be assessed on at least two levels. As a 
foundation for a redirection oflitigative efforts to achieve equal edu-
cational opportunity, it almost certainly fails. There is no· reason to 
believe that the Court that decided Washington v . .Davis and Milliken 
v. Bradley48 would adopt Lawrence's broad definition of segregation 
and his correlative systemic remedy.49 Nor does Lawrence spell out 
in any detail what his remedy might be. Assuming that one could 
prove that "[b]lack children in San Francisco do not escape the 
stigma when the state calls blacks in Los Angeles inferior" (p. 53), 
what follows? That the schools in San Francisco should be inte-
grated? That black children in San Francisco should be compen-
sated for the dignitary harm? That busing in Los Angeles will 
remedy the effects of segregation in San Francisco? We are not told. 
Similarly, Lawrence argues that state involvement in housing dis-
crimination labels black children's families as inferior and thus "vio-
lates [the children's] right to equal educational opportunity under 
the Fourteenth Amendment as defined by Brown" (p. 58). Accord-
47. Lawrence would attribute poorer black performance on the standardized test at issue in 
Washington v. JJavis to the existence of a segregated school system in the District of Columbia 
until 1954 and a tracking system in the public schools that was not dismantled until 1967. P. 
64. 
48. 418 U.S. 717 (1974).· 
49. The Court has been generally unwilling to analyze racial discrimination in systemic 
terms. In Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980) (plurality opinion), the Court rejected a chal-
lenge to the at-large election of city commissioners. The plaintiffs argued that the discrimina-
tory nature of the election process was demonstrated in part by the history of official racial 
discrimination in Alabama as well as the fact that white commissioners elected under the chal-
lenged system discriminated against blacks in municipal employment and in dispensing public 
services. Justice Stewart's opinion, which announced the Judgment of the Court and which 
was joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Rehnquist and Powell, disposed of these asser-
tions as follows: 
[E)vidence of discrimination [in employment and services) by white officials in Mobile is 
relevant only as the most tenuous and circumstantial evidence of the constitutional inva-
lidity of the electoral system under wpich they attained their offices. 
. . . [Furthermore,] past discrimination cannot, in the manner of original sin, con-
demn governmental acllon that is not itself unlawful. The ultimate question remains 
whether a discriminatory intent has been proved in a given case. More oistant instances 
of official discrimination in other cases are of limited help in resolving that question. 
446 U.S. at 74 (footnote omitted). See also J. WILKINSON, supra note 5, at 140: 
(The Court] might have seen school segregation as a product of prejudice in jobs, hous-
ing, politics, public facilities, the military, with discrimination and segregation in each 
part of American life reverberating throughout the whole ...• 
But this broad view, which most accurately accounts for present school segregation, is 
more congenial to historians than to lawyers. . . . Quite apart from analytical obstacles, 
the panoramic view offends the law's caution and pragmatJSm. It suggests that past guilt 
is indigenous and universal, and that drastic amends must immediately be made. 
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ingly, says Lawrence, an appropriate remedy would be "to include 
the school system in formulating [a] remedy" for the housing dis-
crimination (p. 58). Again it is far from clear what sort of remedy is 
being proposed: Added funds to schools in areas walled off by dis-
criminatory housing practices? Busing to remedy a neighborhood 
school policy that created segregated schools? 
On a different level, much can be said for Lawrence's thesis that 
state-imposed school segregation is likely to be but a small part of 
continuing invidious discrimination against blacks. Jim Crow was 
not limited to schools. In the not so distant past, segregation and 
discrimination pervaded housing, transportation, recreational facili-
ties, government offices, and the armed services: "White flight" from 
"changing neighborhoods" and declining white enrollment in 
schools integrated by court decrees evince, at least in part, a linger-
ing ideology that stamps blacks as undesirable neighbors or class-
mates. To the extent that segregation in the schools is only one 
manifestation of the present effects of past segregation, a remedial 
strategy limited to guaranteeing racial balance in the classroom will 
be unlikely to remove the underlying causes of segregation. 
Lawrence recognizes the pervasiveness and durability of the in-
stitutional racism that he describes. He knows that his argument for 
systemic relief- veritably a Green-ing of America -will not fare 
well in the courts.50 He is thus forced to conclude that "[t]he oppres-
sor's understanding of his oppression is limited by self-interest, and 
ultimately we must find ways to make an oppression operate against 
the self-interest of those in power'' (p. 66). Lawrence's gloomy anal-
ysis of the problem and his ambitious solution provide no realistic 
way of improving educational opportunities for black children under 
the regime of Brown. 
D. "The Protection of Class Structure"51 
Alan David Freeman, a visiting professor at the S.U.N.Y. Buf-
falo Law School, paints with as broad a brush as Lawrence. Free-
SO. Theodore Eisenberg's argument that policy reasons justify imposition of a "proximate 
cause" requirement in race discrimination cases would severely undercut Lawrence's sweeping 
analysis. Eisenberg states that "[i]t would be unjust to inflict the entire cost of undoing past 
wrongs on people who are not reasonably responsible for those wrongs. This argument applies 
with particular force when the cost is imposed on third parties who had no part in the prior 
discrimination." Furthermore, if one accepts the conclusion that not all disproportionate im-
pact is unconstitutional, a proximate cause requirement helps establish workable rules for dis-
tinguishing permissible from impermissible uneven impact. Eisenberg, .Disproportionate 
Impact and Illicit Motive: Theories of Constitutional Adjudication, S2 N. Y. U. L. REV. 36, S9-60 
(1977). 
S 1. This section reviews Freeman, supra note 30. 
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man's piece, a condensation of an article he has published 
elsewhere,52 is the most interesting in the collection. 
The core of Freeman's analysis is his distinction between the 
"perpetrator perspective" and the "victim perspective" - a distinc-
tion that turns on one's attention to results. The perpetrator perspec-
tive views discrimination as "the atomistic behavior of persons and 
institutions who have been abstracted out of actual society as part of 
the quest for villains" (p. 74). The perpetrator perspective implies a 
simple remedy: neutralize the villains. It also clears most citizens of 
responsibility; discrimination is not viewed as systemic or as part of a 
social structure that benefits nonminority groups. The solution to 
racism, from this perspective, is simply color-blindness. 
The victim perspective, on the other hand, focuses on results. To 
black Americans in the 1950s, Freeman suggests, Brown must have 
promised more than an end to discrimination. It must have fostered 
an expectation that when discrimination is finally eradicated, there 
would be "some significant change in the conditions of life that one 
associates with past practices of discrimination - segregated 
schools, lack of jobs, the worst jobs, lack of political power" (p. 73).53 
In tracing the development of antidiscrimination law, Freeman 
argues that the Supreme Court's "impatience, fear of embarrassment 
[and] desire for some results" (p. 85) led it to "[toy] with the victim 
perspective" until the mid 1970s (p. 75). With the decisions in Wash-
ington v . .Davis and Mil/iken v. Bradley, however, the Court has 
"reasserted the substantive primacy of the perpetrator perspective by 
pretending never to have strayed away" (p. 76). 
Freeman believes that the Supreme Court's ultimate rejection of 
the victim perspective in cases like Mil/iken v. Bradley "can be un-
derstood as an instance of law as legitimation of the existing class 
structure" (p. 83). The perpetrator perspective "serves to legitimize 
(legally and morally) the major institutions that maintain a dispro-
portionate number of black people as an underclass" (pp. 83-84). It 
is not obvious, as Freeman notes, that maintenance of a black under-
class is in the interests of the ruling class. An underclass is not 
needed for strictly economic reasons, and its existence is an embar-
52. Freeman, Legitimizing Racial .Discrimination Through Ant/discrimination Law: A Criti-
cal Review of Supreme Court .Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. REV. 1049 (1978). 
53. Freeman's analysis is somewhat analogous to Owen Fiss's distinction between a pro-
cess-oriented interpretation (which emphasizes "purification of the decisional process") and 
result-oriented interpretation (which emphasizes ''the achievement of a certain result, im-
provement of the economic and social position of the protected group"). Fiss, The Fate of An 
Idea Whose Time Has Come: Antidiscrimination Law in the Second .Decade ofter Brown v. 
Board of Education, 41 U. CHI. L. REV. 742, 764 (1974). 
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rassment to the United States in the world arena. Why, then, has the 
victim perspective failed to take hold? Freeman suggests several 
answers.54 
First, a remedy attuned to results will necessarily have an adverse 
effect on others. It is hard to imagine the ruling class burdening it-
self to any degree; thus, the dislocative impact will be borne prima-
rily by lower-class whites. This redistribution of burdens is likely to 
produce "hostility and instability which only coercive force can con-
tain" (p. 85). Since the perpetrator perspective guarantees only the 
punishment of villains, not the bestowing of benefits on the under-
class, it is far less likely to have a destabilizing effect on class 
structure. 
Second, Freeman argues, rejection of the victim perspective pre-
serves "a basic presupposition of legal ideology and of the existing 
class structure - the legitimacy of vested rights" (p. 85). Vested 
rights are not threatened by the perpetrator perspective because that 
view "presupposes the innocence of those not implicated, and the 
legitimacy of positions of advantage previously obtained" (p. 86). 
The perpetrator perspective also protects the "ideology" of equal-
ity of opportunity- a concept that Freeman describes as "the major 
rationalization of class domination in this country" (p. 86). Equality 
of opportunity legitimizes class relationships by presupposing "an 
objective, transcendent notion of merit or qualification" (p. 86). It 
thus explains the existing class structure in unobjectionable terms -
as a function of ability, not domination. 
· Freeman's attack on equality of opportunity leads him to a posi-
tion fundamentally at odds with several of the other essays and the 
major theme of Shades of Brown. He writes: 
[T]he movement for "effective education," however pragmatic the im-
pulse behind it, operates to place responsibility on ''victims" while pre-
supposing a structure of equality of opportunity ready to receive them. 
Similarly, I perceive academic efforts to denounce the worth of busing, 
extol segregated schools as representative ·of "American pluralism," 
and recast the issue of Brown as never having had to do with anything 
but the measurable "effectiveness" of education, as, however sincerely 
offered, a structural part of the same process of rationalization repre-
sented by the recent Supreme Court cases. [Pp. 87-88.] 
For Freeman, to reinterpret Brown as mandating quality education 
simply reinforces the regime of equality of opportunity by accepting 
merit as a legitimate explanation and justification for class structure. 
54. Freeman rejects the parlor Marxist explanation that racism is "rationally useful to keep 
the class structure intact" because it serves as a ''necessarily divisive ideology for blocking 
access to class consciousness." P. 84. 
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Freeman's analysis is insightful, but open to challenge. Else-
where, he has applied the victim/perpetrator distinction to areas of 
racial discrimination other than schools.55 Whatever strength it has 
in those areas,56 the analysis seems weak in the context of school 
cases. At least insofar as the Court is defining the constitutional vio-
lation, the Denver, Columbus, and Dayton cases create broad, al- • 
most irrebuttable, presumptions in favor of plainti.ffs.57 
But Freeman's argument has force on a deeper level. While it 
may be true that the Court has facilitated proof of unlawful school 
segregation, this says little about the kind of remedy granted after a 
violation has been established. Freeman's point is that the perpetra-
tor perspective will not produce substantive remedies no matter how 
easily proved the violation because such remedies threaten the 
American class structure. 
His argument finds unlikely support in Nathan Glazer's Affirma-
tive .Discrimination - a book that is a paean to the perpetrator per-
spective. 58 Glazer recognizes the destabilizing effect on American 
society that acceptance of the victim perspective would have: 
Many assert that [the development of affirmative action into require-
ments for even statistical distribution in employment and education] is 
essential if the promise of real freedom and equality for the blacks and 
other American minority groups is to be fulfilled. I have argued . . . 
that equal opportunity, not even statistical distribution, is the proper 
objective of public policy. That argument can be made on constitu-
tional [and] ... pragmatic grounds .... And that argument can also 
be made on political grounds: that equal opportunity represents the 
broadest consensus possible in a multiethnic and yet highly integrated 
society, and that this consensus would be broken if requirements for 
statistical representation were to become a permanent part of Ameri-
can law and public policy.59 
55. See Freeman, supra note 52. 
56. The Court, while tightening the definition of a constitutional violation, has sanctioned 
broad remedial federal legislation in the voting and employment areas. Thus, even though the 
Constitution might not embody the victim perspective, it apparently does not prohibit Con-
gress from enacting statutes that do. Compare Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980), with City 
of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156 (1980); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976), with 
Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980), and Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 449 
(1979). 
57. Keyes v. School Dist. No. I, 413 U.S. 189 (1973) (Denver); Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. 
Penick, 443 U.S. 449 (1979); Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 443 U.S. 526 (1979). 
58. N. GLAZER, supra note 3. Glazer, however, would strenuously disagree with Free-
man's reading of the cases; he believes that the Court, through imposition of statistical require-
ments, has in fact enthroned the victim perspective. Id. at 33-167. 
59. Id. at 168-69. Glazer describes the bitterness between blacks and "ethnic" white 
groups in raw terms: 
From the point of view of the white ethnics, they entered a society in which they were 
scorned; they nevertheless worked hard, they received little or no support from govern-
ment or public agencies, their children received no special attention in school or special 
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Despite Glazer's fear that affirmative action has produced a con-
stitutional commitment to results, Freeman is right that the Court 
has never really transcended the equality-of-opportunity construct. 
Brown itself is the best example. The question framed by the Court 
was not, "Does the denial to black children of a decent education or 
an education equal to that provided whites violate the fourteenth 
amendment?" It was, instead, "Does segregation of children in pub-
lic schools . . . deprive the children of the minority groups of equal 
educational opportunities?"60 Answering the question in the affirma-
tive merely insists that white and black students be offered the same 
educational programs. Indeed, this was a primary purpose of the 
integration remedy: to ensure that a black child receives the same 
education that a white child receives. Focusing on "opportunity" 
permits the courts to ignore the value of the education. Brown is not 
read as requiring that school systems graduate black students fully 
equipped to function in American society. Nor does the "equal op-
portunity'' approach examine whether black children enter the edu-
cational process at a comparative disadvantage and thus are less able 
to benefit from the "equal'' education provided.61 When plaintiffs 
began to raise these types of issues, the courts slammed the door on 
the argument that the Constitution embraced a fundamental right to 
education or guaranteed equal educational results.62 
If the victim perspective and the concept of equality of opportu-
nity embodied in Brown are incompatible, it is clear why Freeman 
does not attempt to return to the "true meaning" of Brown. Even 
recasting Brown as guaranteeing an "effective education'' would pro-
duce a remedy that merely equips blacks to compete in the existing 
meritocracy. Under this interpretation, Brown loses its potential for 
critiquing race or class domination. 
opportunity to attend college, they received no special consideration from courts and legal 
defenders. They contrast their situation with that of blacks and other minority groups 
today and see substantial differences in treatment. They consider themselves patriotic and 
appreciative of the United States even though they received no special benefit. They look 
at the minority groups and find them abusive of the state thou~ they do receive special 
benefit. This may be a crude and unfair comparison; after all, tne blacks were brought in 
chains as slaves and the whites came as free men, blacks have continually dealt with the 
most severe and unbending prejudice, whereas that met by immigrants was mild and 
scarcely to be found after the second generation, and we could continue the comparison. 
But the perception cannot be dismissed as false either, and however we disagree over how 
"true" it is historically, it plays a great weight in politics and in the belief of white ethnic 
groups that they are subject to unfair policies. 
Nothing is so powerful in the modem world as the perception of unfairness. 
Id. at 194-95. 
60. 347 U.S. at 493 (emphasis added). 
61. See text at notes 87-95 infra. 
62. See cases cited in note 36 supra. 
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What Freeman seeks is not fulfillment of Brown's promise of 
equal educational opportunity. He seeks instead the realization of 
black perceptions of what Brown symbolized: substantive improve-
ments in the lives of black people. This result, he acknowledges, is 
unlikely to be achieved through litigation (p. 83). Freeman, then, is 
as pessimistic as Lawrence about the likelihood of achieving mean-
ingful results through the courts. But Freeman goes a step further by 
directly challenging the goal sought by the other contributors to 
Shades of Brown. For him, an "effective education" is meaningless 
unless one is willing to confront the ideology that supports and justi-
fies prevailing class relations - equality of opportunity. If Freeman 
is correct, the programmatic suggestions of Shades of Brown must be 
viewed as ultimately self-defeating. 
But one need not go this far. It seems clear that improving the 
quality of education provided to black children is a legitimate short-
term goal that can only facilitate the achievement of one's long-term 
goal, whatever it might be (Carter's is integration; Freeman's, an end 
to class oppression). Freeman may be right about the intractability 
of the American class structure and its supporting ideologies. But 
this should not stop the effort, as Bell describes it in the Introduction, 
to "move school desegregation policies toward alternative visions of 
what Brown and its promise might still mean for those who need it 
most" (p. x) - that is, a decent education for black children. 
E. "The Relationship to White Interests"63 
In addition to introductory notes, Bell contributes an essay and a 
model alternative desegregation plan. In "Brown and the Interest-
Convergence Dilemma,"64 he seeks to answer Herbert Wechsler's 
challenge to develop a neutral principle that decides Brown.65 He 
offers what he terms a principle of "interest convergence": 
The interest of blacks in achieving racial equality will be accommo-
dated only when it converges with the interests of whites; however, the 
fourteenth amendment, standing alone, will not authorize a judicial 
remedy providing effective racial equality for blacks where the remedy 
sought threatens the superior societal status of middle- and upper-class 
whites. [P. 95.] 
The interests that converged in Brown, according to Bell, were black 
interests in ending segregation and white interests in answering the 
63. This Section reviews Bell, supra note 30. 
64. P. 91. This essay may also be found at 93 HARV, L. REV. 518 (1980). See also D, BELL, 
RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN LAW 437-44 (2d ed. 1980), 
65. See Wechsler, supra note 2. 
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attack of Communism on American racism, in reassuring blacks re-
turning from World War II that notions of equality and freedom 
might be realized at home, and in helping the South transform itself 
from a rural to an industrial society. 
Fulfillment of Brown, however, breeds interest-divergence. Bell 
argues, as does Freeman, that racial equality comes at a price to 
whites, who must sacrifice local school policies and resources. This 
divergence was manifest in massive Southern defiance of desegrega-
tion orders. The defiance was initially met with the full force of judi-
cial power;66 but once judicial supremacy had been reestablished, the 
Court began to erect barriers (such as the intent requirement) to lim-
it Brown in the face of growing white opposition. 
Bell believes that white and black interests are more likely to 
converge in the context of a remedial strategy that focuses on equal-
ity of educational opportunity than on racial balance.67 Although 
Bell does not so state, one can infer that whites may be willing to buy 
their way out of busing by supporting improvement of educational 
programs in predominantly black schools. The Department of Jus-
tice has apparently recognized the likelihood of convergence implicit 
in Bell's approach. It has recently announced that it will no longer 
seek "mandatory busing" in school cases; instead, it will concentrate 
its efforts on school districts that provide inferior education in mi-
nority schools. 68 
Both Bell and the Administration have understandably been ac-
cused of returning, not to Brown, but to Plessy v. Ferguson. It is a 
charge that Bell does not wholly deny: 
Desegregation remedies that do not integrate may seem to step back-
ward toward the Plessy "separate but equal" era. Some black educa-
tors, however, see major educational benefits in schools where black 
children, parents, and teachers can utilize the real cultural strengths of 
66. See Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958) (ordering desegregation of the Little Rock, 
Ark. schools). 
67. It is interesting that both Bell and John W. Davis (arguing on behalf of segregated 
schools in Brown) have quoted with approval W.E.B. DuBois's 1935 article, Does the Negro 
Need Separate Schools?, 4 J. NEGRO EDUC. 328 (1935). See ARGUMENT, supra note 17, at 51; 
Bell, Serving .1wo Masters: Integration Ideals and Client Interests in School Desegregation Lili• 
gation, 85 YALE L.J. 470, 515 (1976). 
68. See U.S. May Sue Boards on Schooling Equality, N.Y. Times, Oct. 6, 1981, at 10, col. 1. 
q: Taylor, Lawyers Assail U.S. Stand on Chicago School Plan, N.Y. Times, Feb. 14, 1982, at 
14, coL 3 (reporting that William Bradford Reynolds, Assistant Attorney General in charge of 
the Civil Rights division of the Justice Department said: "Any students who want to have an 
integrated education ought to have it. But if there are students out there who do not want an 
integrated education, we should not be compelling them to get on a bus to have one."). The 
Reagan Administration has also announced that it will no longer rely on the "Keyes presump-
tion" in desegregation suits. U.S. Alters Policy on Desegregation: Integration of Whole District 
Won't Be Pursued ff Only a Portion is Involved, N.Y. Times, Nov. 20, 1981, at 9, col. 1. 
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the black community to overcome the many barriers to educational 
achievement. [P. 101.] 
He has written elsewhere that the separate-but-equal doctrine of 
Plessy was "re-oriented," but not overruled in Brown, 69 and that 
"[t]he principles of Plessy v. Ferguson as well as [those of] Brown v. 
Board of Education can be used effectively."70 
Bell's argument is aimed primarily at civil rights attorneys. For 
the past decade, he has criticized the single-minded pursuit of inte-
gration. 71 His attacks have drawn heavy fire from his former col-
leagues in the civil rights bar72 - "a fact," as he puts it, "that has 
brought me much sadness" (p. 136). But clearly he is no traitor to 
the movement. Bell's plan is obviously not to return to the unequal 
days of Plessy, but rather to resurrect the educational promise of 
Brown. Such a strategy, he believes, will accord more closely to the 
wishes of black parents, will be more likely to provide black children 
with a decent education, and will be less likely to provoke the strenu-
ous opposition of whites. 
There is interesting evidence that Bell's views are gaining adher-
ents among minority groups involved in school cases. In a recent 
district court opinion in the unending Dallas desegregation litiga-
tion, the court noted the intervention of a new party, the Black Coa-
lition to Maximize Education. 73 The court described the Black 
Coalition as "a broad-based minority community group composed 
of parents, patrons and taxpayers with children in the [Dallas school 
district], as well as representatives from a number of civic, political 
and ecumenical associations in the black community."74 After quot-
ing a statement in one of Bell's articles to the effect that courts 
should recognize the "growing disagreement in black communities 
over the nature of school relief," the court stated: 
By its intervention in this lawsuit, the Black Coalition merely gives 
formal recognition to the same undercurrents of tension and disunity 
among blacks that were experienced over the lengthy course of deseg-
regation litigation in such large cities as Atlanta, Detroit, Nashville 
and Boston .... 
The Black Coalition represents a substantial body of blacks who 
are opposed to any escalation in the use of racial balance remedies to 
cure the effects of school segregation. The Coalition prefers remedies 
69. See Bell, supra note 29, at 353. 
10. Id. at 373. 
11. See generally Bell, supra note 21; Bell, supra note 67. 
12. See, e.g., Jones, supra note 5. 
73. Tasliy v. Wright, 520 F. Supp. 683, 689 (N.D. Tex. 1981). 
74. 520 F. Supp. at 689. 
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designed to improve educational quality and to eliminate the disparity 
in academic achievement that can be attributed to past segregation, as 
alternatives to remedies that require public assignments to non-
contiguous attendance zones and mandatory transportation. 75 
The court went on to find that further busing to desegregate the Dal-
las schools was not feasible due to considerations of time, distance, 
and demographic trends. The position taken by the Black Coalition 
clearly made the court's decision easier: "[T]he imposition of 
mandatory transportation on minority parents and children who are 
opposed to such a remedy is unfair and paternalistic."76 
It appears, then, that judges - faced with massive white opposi-
tion, declining respect for their orders, and the prospect of burden-
some superintendency of a school system - may use disunity in the 
minority ranks as a reason for denying traditional remedies in deseg-
regation cases. To ensure that his criticism of current desegregation 
policies does not create a remedial void, Bell must provide a compel-
ling theory that authorizes and justifies new remedies in school cases. 
He meets this challenge by proposing a "model alternative desegre-
gation plan" in the final chapter of Shades of Brown. 
Ill. PUTTING EDUCATION INTO DESEGREGATION 
A. Bell's "Model Alternative Desegregation ~Ian" 
Bell's proposal would require the establishment of a small com-
mittee of educators, minority parents, a social scientist, and perhaps 
a lawyer77 to draft an alternative desegregation plan based on the 
community's comments. The plan would "aim to bring minority 
schools up to the academic standards of mainly white schools in the 
district," provide for strong, dynamic school board leadership and 
75. 520 F. Supp. at 690 (footnotes omitted). 
76. 520 F. Supp. at 733. The changing perspective of minority representatives is also ap-
parent in recent developments in the Nashville desegregation litigation. In an opinion handed 
down in May 1980, the district judge noted that a "dramatic role reversal has taken place" in 
the twenty-five-year-old litigations: 
Historically, black plaintiffs felt the necessity to be in a majority white school in order to 
be assured of equal distribution of educational funding. The assertion and recognition of 
the right to equal protection of the laws has rendered this reason irrelevant in today's 
climate • . . . In this case, we have a white majority in the school board, acting on the 
advice of a white desegregation expert, recommending to the Court more bussing to 
achieve more racial balance. Equally contrary to earlier posture, the black plaintiffs' urge 
upon the Court less bussing, more neighborhood characteristics to the assignment plan, 
and the permissibility of majority black schools. 
Kelley v. Metropolitan County Bd. of Educ., 492 F. Supp. 167, 184 (M.D. Tenn. 1980) (empha-
sis in original). 
77. Bell states that "a lawyer knowledgeable in school desegregation law, but sympathic to 
the idea of alternative desegregation plans could prove a helpful addition to the committee, 
but may prove difficult to find." P. 129. 
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parent involvement, ensure equalization of funding between white 
and black schools, and include a "majority to minority provision" to 
give black parents the right to have their children attend predomi-
nantly white schools (p. 130). Plans could also include bilingual and 
bicultural courses, vocational training and counseling components, 
and new disciplinary procedures for school districts in which dispro-
portionate numbers of black children are suspended or expelled (p. 
131). 
Bell's strategy of attaching educational components to desegrega-
tion remedies has been approved by the Supreme Court. In Milliken 
II,18 the Court sanctioned such provisions in a decree that required 
the Detroit school board to adopt reading programs and end dis-
criminatory examinations. The Court also approved the establish-
ment of in-service training programs for staff and counseling 
programs for students to help with the desegregation effort.79 Lower 
courts have relied on Milliken II in ordering similar educational 
components. so 
While Milliken II appears to indicate the feasibility of Bell's 
plan, it actually demonstrates the weakness of the strategy. Unlike 
Carter, Bell does not argue for a new definition of the right recog-
nized in Brown; he does not contend that a plaintiff showing that he 
or she is receiving a poor education has established a violation of the 
fourteenth amendment. Rather, he proposes a new remedy once a 
court has found unlawful segregation in a school system. Thus, the 
efficacy of his proposal depends upon the ability of plaintiffs to con-
tinue to demonstrate unconstitutional segregation. There are, how-
ever, indications that we are approaching the end of the road for 
desegregation suits. Indeed, it appears that the judicial intervention 
so vigorously contested by school districts can now serve as a shield 
against charges of unlawful racial imbalance. This occurs in the fol-
lowing way. 
Once the plaintiffs prove unlawful segregation, Green demands 
"root and branch" dismantling of the dual system. Since Swann, this 
78. Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267 (1977). 
79. 433 U.S. at 283-88. There is less to Milliken II than meets the eye. The petitioner in 
the case was the State of Michigan, which had been ordered by the district court to pay half the 
cost of the remedial program ($5.8 million). The school board joined the plaintiffs in seeking 
affirmance of the district court decree. Justice Powell, in his separate opinion, stated that the 
board and the plaintiffs had 'joined forces apparently for the purpose of extracting funds from 
the State treasury." 433 U.S. at 293 (Powell, J., concurring). 
80. See, e.g., Evans v. Buchanan, 582 F.2d 750, 767-74 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 
923 (1980); Tasby v. Wright, 520 F. Supp. 683, 741-42 (N.D. Tex. 1981); Kelley v. Metropoli-
tan County Bd. of Educ., 511 F. Supp. 1363, 1368-71 (M.D. Tenn. 1981); Reed v. Rhodes, 455 
F. Supp. 569, 597-602 (N.D. Ohio 1978). 
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has meant some form of racial balance in the schools. To ensure 
effective desegregation, district courts often review and direct the ac-
tivities of school authorities for a substantial period of time. Under 
the court's close supervision, a range of remedial activities may be 
undertaken, such as the redrawing of school zones and feeder pat-
terns, busing, and the establishment of so-called "magnet" schools. 
At some point, the court will become convinced that the dual system 
has been obliterated - that the school system has purged itself of all 
vestiges of segregation. The court can then attribute any subsequent 
resegregation - absent a radical shift in district policies - to private 
choices, not impermissible state action. If racial imbalance reap-
pears, it will be nonactionable. 
The Court, as long ago as Swann, indicated that judicial supervi-
sion of a school district should end once a "unitary" system had been 
achieved.81 This was made more explicit in Pasadena City Board of 
Education v. Spangler, 82 where the Court held that the district court 
had exceeded its authority in requiring annual readjustment of at-
tendance zones to guarantee that there be no school in Pasadena 
with a majority of minority members. The Court stated: 
[H]aving once implemented a racially neutral attendance pattern in 
order to remedy the perceived constitutional violations on the part of 
the defendants, the District Court had fully performed its function of 
providing the appropriate remedy for previous racially discriminatory 
attendance patterns. 83 
District courts, faced with seemingly unending supervision of school 
systems, have begun to find that school boards have met the Swann 
test. 84 Although some of these attempts to withdraw jurisdiction 
81. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 31-32 (1971): 
At some point, these school authorities and others like them should achieve full compli-
ance with this Court's decision in Brown I. The systems would then be "unitary" in the 
sense required by our [earlier] decisions .... 
It does not follow that the communities served by such systems will remain demo-
graphically stable, for in a growing, mobile society, few will do so. Neither school author-
ities nor district courts are constitutionally required to make year-by-year adjustments of 
the racial composition of student bodies once the affirmative duty to desegregate has been 
accomplished and racial discrimination through official action is eliminated from the sys-
tem. This does not mean that federal courts are without power to deal with future 
problems; but in the absence of a showing that either the school authorities or some other 
agency of the State has deliberately attempted to fix or alter demographic patterns to 
affect the racial composition of the schools, further intervention by a district court should 
not be necessary. 
82. 427 U.S. 424 (1976). 
83. 427 U.S. at 436-37. 
84. See Calhoun v. Cook, 522 F.2d 717, 719 (5th Cir. 1975); United States v. South Park 
Independent School Dist., 491 F. Supp. 1177 (E.D. Tex. 1980), revrl. sub nom. United States v. 
Texas Educ. Agency, 647 F.2d 504 (5th Cir. 1981); Liddell v. Board of Educ., 469 F. Supp. 
1304, 1360-64 (E.D. Mo. 1979), revrl. sub nom. Adams v. United States, 620 F.2d 1277 (8th Cir. 
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have been rejected by the courts of appeals, 85 it seems likely that 
"purge cases" will appear with increasing frequency in the days 
ahead. 
The result, of course, will be irremediable racially imbalanced 
schools. Once the current crop of desegregation cases run their 
course, Bell will be left with no decrees to which he can append his 
educational components. Litigation will return to the pre-Brown 
strategy of "equalization," that is, demonstrating that black schools 
have funding, programs, or staffs inferior to those of white schools. 
But even these lawsuits are unlikely to be effective. First, there is 
little evidence that predominantly black schools are receiving lower 
per-pupil allotments than white schools in the same district. 86 Fur-
thermore, in inner-city school districts, there may simply be no ma-
jority white schools with which to make a comparison. In short, 
under a regime that recognizes purge and demands only equaliza-
tion, the blatant inadequacies of inner-city schools will become 
largely immune to fourteenth amendment challenge. 
B. The Undiscoverable Right to an Effective or Equal Education 
The preceding bleak line of reasoning follows from Bell's strat-
egy of proposing a new remedy rather than attempting to redefine 
the underlying right at issue in Brown. An apparently simple solu-
tion would be to argue that Brown, or the fourteenth amendment, 
guarantees a quality education. But Bell is no doubt aware that the 
courts have firmly rejected this argument. In San Antonio Independ-
ent School .District v. Rodriguez, the Court held that education is not 
a "fundamental right" protected by the fourteenth amendment, and 
that interdistrict comparisons of educational quality are not subject 
to constitutional scrutiny. 87 
But even if the fourteenth amendment does not embrace a right 
1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 826 (1981). q: Lee v. Macon County Bd. of Educ., 584 F.2d 78 
(5th Cir. 1978) (upholding the district court's finding of a unitary system). 
85. See the South Park and Liddell cases cited in note 84 supra. 
86. See Brown v. Board of Educ., 386 F. Supp. 110 (N.D. III. 1974) (average disparity in 
per-pupil expenditures between white and black schools in Chicago approximately one per-
cent; complaint dismissed); I B. LEVIN, T. MULLER, W. SCANLON & M. COHEN, PUBLIC 
SCHOOL FINANCE: PRESENT DISPARITIES AND FISCAL ALTERNATIVES 271-308 (1972) (finding 
that while a district's discretionary funds may be concentrated in schools serving higher-in-
come, low-minority neighborhoods, state and federal compensatory funds are directed to 
lower-income, high-minority schools). 
87. 411 U.S. I (1973). Indeed, Bell has been told this before. In response to his earlier 
criticism of the civil rights bar for pursuing integration instead of education, see Bell, supra 
note 67, Nathaniel Jones, then NAACP General Counsel, wrote: ''The Bell indictment of civil 
rights lawyers . . . fails . . . most conspicuously for the simple reason that there is no cause of 
action for educational quality per se." Jones, supra note 5, at 379. 
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to a quality education, we may be able to interpret the guarantee of 
"equal educational opportunity" in such a way as to advance the 
cause of improved education for black children. 88 A number of so-
cial scientists have suggested that a proper definition of equal oppor-
tunity would take into account unequal starting positions of white 
and black students. 89 Equal opportunity under this interpretation 
would not mean simply that white and black students should be pro-
vided the same educational package or that per-pupil expenditures 
should be equalized. Rather, equal educational opportunity would 
mean the attainment of certain minimal standards of proficiency that 
would enable initially disadvantaged students to compete on more 
equal terms upon leaving school. Students would thus be entitled to 
different educational programs depending upon how far away they 
start from acceptable levels of academic achievement. As James 
Coleman has written, this perspective requires transformation of the 
view of the school from "an agency within which the child is taught" 
to an agency "responsible for seeing that the child leams."90 This 
conception of equal educational opportunity might make it possible 
for the courts to chart a middle course between the quality sought by 
Bell (but denied by Rodriguez) and the equality cum integration de-
manded by current interpretations of Brown. Brown could be read 
as guaranteeing a right to educational programs that compensate for 
the unequal starting positions of blacks and whites. 
While this may be a plausible reading of the fourteenth amend-
ment, it is not one that the courts are likely to adopt. Such an inter-
pretation would place an intolerable burden on the judiciary to 
examine initial inequalities, plan special curricula to meet the needs 
of disadvantaged students, and undertake on-going evaluations of 
the particular educational programs chosen.91 As one court has 
88. There is no agreed-upon definition of equal educational opportunity. For collections 
of different formulations, see Coleman, The Concept of Equality of Educational Opportunity, 38 
HARV. EDUC. REV. 7 (1968); McDermott & Klein, The Cost-Quality .Debate in School Finance 
Litigation: .Do .Dollars Make a .Difference?, 38 LAW & CoNTEMP. PROB. 415, 416-23 (1974); 
Mosteller & Moynihan,A Pathbreaking Report, in ON EQUALITY OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTU• 
NITY, supra note 38, at 6-7. 
89. Edmund Gordon, for instance, has written, "[e)qual educational opportunity demands 
that, where what children bring to school is unequal, what the school puts in must be unequal 
and individualized to insure that what the school produces is at least equal at the basic levels 
of achievement." Gordon, Toward .Defining Equality of Educational Opportunity, in ON 
EQUALITY !)F EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY, supra note 38, at 423, 433. 
90. Coleman, Responsibility of the Schools in the Provision of Equal Educational Opportu-
nity, in EDUCATION FOR WHOM?, supra note 23, at 100, 107. 
91. Commentators have argued that the measurement of educational need and value is 
beyond the competence of the judiciary. See, e.g., Yudof, Equal Educational Opportunity and 
the Courts, 51 TEXAS L. REv. 411, 472-85 (1973). 
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stated: 
[T]he courts have neither the knowledge, nor the means, nor the 
power to tailor the public moneys to fit the varying needs of . . . stu-
dents throughout the state. We can only see to it that the outlays for 
one group are not invidiously greater or less than that of another.92 
It is not surprising, therefore, that the Supreme Court has summarily 
affirmed the dismissal of two suits that claimed that the fourteenth 
amendment requires states to fund school systems based on the edu-
cational needs of the students.93 
It is thus understandable why Bell's strategy for a better educa-
tion for black children involves adding an educational component to 
traditional desegregation remedies rather than redefining the right at 
issue.94 As the Detroit and Dallas cases demonstrate, Bell's strategy 
can spark an important shift in thinking about desegregation reme-
dies; the inclusion of compensatory and remedial programs may 
have a substantial impact on the educational opportunities of blacks. 
But ultimately Bell's plan, focused as it is on remedies, can achieve 
only short-term results. "White flight" and "purge" will, at some 
point in the near future, mean the end for traditional desegregation 
efforts. When racial imbalance becomes nonactionable, Bell's reme-
dial strategy will dissolve.95 
92. Burruss v. Wilkerson, 310 F. Supp. 572, 574 (W.D. Va. 1969) (three-judge court), o.ffd. 
per curiam, 397 U.S. 44 (1970). See San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 41 I 
U.S. 1, 42-43 (1973). 
93. Burruss v. Wilkerson, 397 U.S. 44 (1970), o.ffg.percuriam, 310 F. Supp. 572 (W.D. Va. 
1969); Mclnnis v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 322 (1969), a.ffg. per curiam, Mcinnis v. Shapiro, 293 F. 
Supp. 327 (N.D. Ill. 1968). 
94. Bell's proposed model decree would "aim to bring minority schools up to the academic 
standards of mainly white schools in the districts." P. 130. This nebulous formulation is 
spelled out later when Bell suggests that "[t]he courts, school boards, and concerned parents 
can utilize standard test-score results to measure the improvement in effectiveness of black 
schools. They might also note dropout rates; disciplinary statistics; the percentage of graduates 
going on to college, training programs and/or into full-time employment; and similar meas-
ures." P. 137. These factors are identified in order to define appropriate remedial components, 
not the fourteenth amendment violation. 
95. It is surprising that, in the face of Rodriguez, Bell does not recall the 0. Henry ending 
to Henry Hart's classic ./Jialectic: "the state courts." Hart, The Power of Congress to Limit the 
Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An Exercise in ./Jialectic, 66 HARV. L. Rev. 1362, 1401 (1953). 
Under state constitutions, a number of state supreme courts have ordered the inter-district 
equalization of financing that was denied in Rodriguez. See Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 
487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 594 (1971); Horton v. Meskill, 172 Conn. 615, 376 A.2d 359 
(1977); Robinson v. Cahill, 62 NJ. 473,303 A.2d 273, cert. denied, 414 U.S. 976 (1973); Seattle 
School Dist. No. I v. State, 90 Wash. 2d 476, 585 P.2d 71 (1978); Washakie County School 
Dist. No. One v. Hershler, 606 P.2d 310 (Wyo. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 824 (1981). These 
cases may have a greater potential for permanently improving educational opportunities in 
predominantly minority school districts than further federal desegregation suits. However, not 
all state courts have been persuaded to grant such relief. See Shofstall v. Hollins, I IO Ariz. 88, 
515 P.2d 590 (1973); Thompson v. Engelking, 96 Idaho 793, 537 P.2d 635 (1975); Board of 
Educ. v. Walter, 58 Ohio St. 2d 368, 390 N.E.2d 813 (1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1015 (1980); 
Olsen v. State, 276 Or. 9, 554 P.2d 139 (1976); Danson v. Casey, 484 Pa. 415, 399 A.2d 360 
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It would be a mistake to allow the present conflict over the bene-
fits of further school desegregation to cloud Brown's achievements. 
Brown, quite simply, buried Jim Crow. It would also be a mistake to 
cling uncritically to our original understanding of Brown. That un-
derstanding, in the minds and arguments of those who litigated and 
decided Brown, was that education and integration were inextricably 
linked. But the hopes and theories that bound these two concepts 
have been buffeted for more than two decades by demographics and 
politics. As a result, integration has been rendered virtually unat-
tainable in large urban areas. These facts have led the contributors 
to Shades of Brown to chart a new course for Brown - one that 
seeks to ensure that education does not go down tied to the mast of 
the integration ship. 
The essays adopt different approaches in attempting to reinter-
pret Brown. Carter and Ravitch seek to redefine the right at issue in 
Brown. Lawrence and Freeman argue that racial discrimination in 
schools must be understood as part of a larger social phenomenon, 
and that desegregation remedies will fail if they do not attack the 
system as a whole. Bell sets out a remedial plan that can be imple-
mented under the current law. These approaches, as should be ap-
parent from the preceding discussion, sometimes conflict with one 
another and vary in likelihood of success in the courts. But the sig-
nificance of Shades of Brown lies not in the cogency of any particular 
essay; the essays are more suggestive than persuasive. The book's 
significance lies in the fact that seven scholars dedicated to education 
and the vindication of civil rights can begin to question the prevail-
ing liberal interpretation of Brown, the interpretation that · has 
shaped three decades of litigation and had massive social 
consequences. 
Shades of Brown is successful in returning our attention to the 
educational aspects of Brown. The problem is that the essays do not 
provide a convincing solution to the problem they identify. Courts 
are unlikely to accept Carter's attempt to make Brown into a case 
that requires the evaluation of the benefits of the educational pro-
cess. BeWs plan is modest and short-term at best. Lawrence is aware 
that his systemic remedy cannot b~ achieved through the courts. 
And Freeman recognizes that a guarantee of substantive results is 
(1979). Furthermore, the relationship of "dollars spent'' to "quality achieved" remains prob-
lematic. See McDermott & Klein, supra note 88, at 423-54. 
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fundamentally inconsistent with the prevailing regime of equality of 
opportunity. 
A decade ago, Alexander Bickel prophesied that "Brown v. Board 
of Education, with emphasis on the education part of the title, may 
be headed for - dread word - irrelevance."96 Although Bickel's 
prediction appears accurate as a judicial matter,97 there exist other 
arenas for achieving important social goals: the political branches of 
local, state, and federal governments. If Shades of Brown is persua-
sive in stimulating reconsideration of the single-minded pursuit of 
integration, resources expended in desegregation suits could be 
rededicated to a political fight for improving educational opportuni-
ties afforded black children. Nonjudicial institutions may ultimately 
prove no more interested than the courts in the quality of education 
in inner-city schools. But we should not close the book on Brown 
simply because the courts refuse to write the next chapter. 
96. A. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS 151 (1970), 
97. Dean Read has perceptively observed: 
[T]he problem of providing equal educational opportunities to all defies a legal solution 
based solely on a race theory of equal protection. As long as "blackness" and poverty are 
inescapably linked, and as long as minority plaintiffs cannot themselves agree on the 
proper remedy, perhaps the twenty year effort to implement the promise of Brown has, in 
fact, reached its logical conclusion. The problems of school segregation in the cities may 
be so intractable that one tool - the constitutional co=and of equal educational oppor-
tunity for all races articulated in Brown - cannot and should not be expected to solve 
alone the problem of segregated education. Until new tools are found and implemented 
- a negative income tax or experimentation with John Rawls' theories of distributive 
justice or some other, yet unborn, idea - it is at least arguable that the limits have been 
reached in using the Constitution alone as a means for attaining school desegregation. 
Read, Judicial Evolution of the Law of School Integration Since Brown v. Board of Education, 
39 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 7, 48-49 (1975) (footnotes omitted). 
